In smart power grid systems, real-time electricity data sharing can bring many benefits. However the security and privacy challenges have been a concern. This is because shared data may contain some private and sensitive information of data owners or users. So it has been an important issue to balance data utilization, data privacy and users privacy. Privacy-preserving multi-authority attribute-based encryption (MA-ABE) is a promising tool to tackle this issue, but it cannot be directly applied to addressed scenario of smart power grid systems. In this paper, we propose a framework to achieve secure data sharing in smart grid. The scheme uses the technique of inner product encryption (IPE). Under this framework, the access policy and the attribute set are fuzzy by converting them into two vectors. Only when the two vectors are orthogonal, users can successfully obtain the sharing data. Besides, our scheme allows that the threshold access policy only involves attribute name indexes, and sensitive attribute values are not sent along with the shared data so the attribute privacy is preserved. In addition, in order to improve efficiency, our scheme adds a testing phase to avoid the unnecessary operation before recovering data. Finally, our performance analysis and experiments confirm the merits of the proposed framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart grid is recognized as the next generation of power grid, which is essentially the intelligence of the grid. Using integrated and high-speed two-way communication network and advanced sensing, measuring equipment technology, smart grid realizes the safety, economy and efficiency of the grid. There are two parts including power flow and information flow in a smart grid system as in FIGURE 1. Electricity is generated at the power generation and distributed by substations to use by home appliances. The information network consists of several components involving grid operator (GO), multiple distribution grid operators (DGOs), smart meters, The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Amin Hajizadeh.
WiFi technology, home area network (HAN), building area network (BAN), neighborhood area network (NAN), remote terminal units (RTUs) and electricity consumers. There are two parts information aggregation and access control in the information network. The process of information aggregation is as follows: firstly, the real-time electricity data of the smart meter in each HAN is collected and sent to BAN; then all information is aggregated by the gateway BAN and is sent it to NAN; finally, the gateway NAN reports all information to RTUs, and reports relevant information to electricity consumers. With real-time electricity data, RTUs can manage the grid more accurately.
In addition, electricity consumption data can be used for other organizations outside the grid system, for example, it can be used to calculate cost, monitor unexpected behavior, and predict future conditions. However, the electricity consumption data of a single smart meter contains private information, such as the habits and lifestyles of families, so that these data need to be well protected. Therefore, how to balance the availability and privacy of power consumption data is problem for the smart grid. RTUs and electricity consumers want to control the access from the users. In addition, the users want to get different electricity information based on their specific task. For example, maintenance officers and system engineers who monitor the network, while cost calculation and analysis will be performed by the auditor. Therefore, the fine-grained access control becomes important in smart grid. However, the existing schemes on the smart grid mostly focus on the issue of information aggregation, but ignore the issue of access control and privacy-protection in the process of sharing power data.
To address these problems, many techniques have been proposed. In these techniques, attribute-based encryption (ABE) has been considered as a practical and efficient method since it not only protects the privacy of sensitive data but also supports fine-grained access control to the encrypted data. Under this framework, the access policy over a set of attributes is defined by power data owners, including RTUs and electricity consumers, and is applied to share the power data. So only authorized users whose attributes satisfy the policy can decrypt power data encrypted.
II. RELATED WORK A. SMART GRID
Smart grid architecture was proposed and discussed by Bose [2] , which involved power network and information network [3] . The information network can ensure the safety and dependability of the smart grid by measuring the status of equipment in the grid, balancing supply and demand, helping diagnose faults and so on. There are several important issues including security, efficiency and privacy issues in smart grids system. The schemes in [4] - [6] , [13] focus on the access control for electricity consumption data in smart grid.
Hur [5] proposed an ABE scheme in smart grid. Both the data and the policies are obfuscated during the data sharing process. However, most of them relied on a single GO. The access control schemes were proposed in [9] , [15] , which were distributed and did not rely on a single GO to generate the keys for making the approach robust. However, the issue of privacy has not been taken into consideration. In addition, existing literatures focused on privacy protection [7] , [10] - [12] , [14] . However, these schemes do not uniformly achieve privacy of data, attributes and policies. Alharbi and Lin [12] proposed an efficient privacy preservation identity based signcryption (IBS) scheme in downlink communication for smart grids. A communication model is considered by Sedaghat et al. [11] , in which the storage center as a delegated third party with a powerful computational ability is responsible to decrypt the shared ciphertexts partially for decreasing the burden of the authorized end users. A practical data aggregation scheme was proposed in [10] with privacy-preserving, in which did not mention of access control for the sharing data.
B. MA-ABE SCHEMES WITH PRIVACY-PROTECTION
Since Sahai and Waters [1] firstly proposed the ABE scheme, the research on ABE has been further expanded in recent years. The existing ABE scheme can realize fine-grained access control by encrypting messages with various access policies. In addition, with the emergence of sharing confidential enterprise data on cloud storage servers, access policies can be defined by multiple authorities, and data are generated by multiple organizations, therefore multi-authority ABE have been proposed to solve those problems. On the other hand, the multiple authorities can also protect users' privacy and reduce the burden of center authority to a certain extent. Therefore, a multi-authority ABE scheme with hiding access policy needs to be proposed. It started with the one by Chase [17] with a central authority (CA) and global identify (GID), where GID prevented the collusion attacks from malicious users. But it was limited to the AND-gate policy. Müller et al. [18] proposed the other one with CA and could be expressed by the LSSS access structure. However, the CA must be honest in [17] , [18] . Then Chase and Chow introduced a new scheme that the center was removed [19] . However, The cooperate among multiple authorities was necessary during the system initialization phase. Later, Lewko and Waters [20] introduced a decentralized multi-authority ABE, in which the CA was removed so that any authorities could join or leave freely the system without reinitializing the system. However, none of these schemes supports privacyprotection.
Privacy-protection in MA-ABE is starting from the scheme due to Zhong et al. [21] in 2016. In this scheme, they proposed firstly the policy-hiding ABE scheme using multi-attribute authority architecture. But the exponential computing cost was required during the decryption due to pairing operations. In 2017, Fan et al. [22] presented a policyhiding MA-CP-ABE scheme with constant length ciphertext.
But this scheme relied on a weaker model which was called weakly policy (attribute)-hiding. Under this model, a party might decrypt the received ciphertexts but the policy was remained unknown to any users, which means the policy may be leaked only upon the final successful decryption. In 2018, Belguith et al. [23] presented a securely outsourcing policy-hiding MA-ABE scheme based on LSSS for cloud assisted IoT, but it only achieved selective security which was a weak security model. Recently, Michalevsky et al proposed a full policy-hiding ABE based on IPE [24] . It supported disjunctions, conjunctions and threshold policies and protected the access policies from any user and party that were not authorized to recover the messages. However, this scheme needed coordinations among the authorities at the beginning of Setup algorithm. Additionally, their scheme relied on the random oracle and was reduced to the SXDH assumption and k-Lin assumption [24] .
C. DATA TESTING
Above these ABE schemes only perform the attribute matching detection during the process of decryption, which is not practical due to the large amount of computation. To tack the challenge above, a matching phase was additionally introduced by computing special components in ciphertext before the decryption phase in [25] , [26] , which is used to test whether the attribute secret keys match the hidden policy without decryption. However, it was proven that scheme proposed by Zhang et al. could not realize user's attributes privacy protection in [27] .
III. MOTIVATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS A. MOTIVATIONS
Despite some attribute-based frameworks have been presented for smart grid system, there are still many problems that need to be solved as follows.
1) MULTI-AUTHORITY ACCESS CONTROL
In existing frameworks of smart grid, GO generally is a centralized key distribution authority to send all secret credentials, so it is easy to single point of failure and could lead to huge losses of personal information. For example, once the single GO is attacked, entire grid systems will be disrupted. Meanwhile, GO needs to be online all the time. In order to address above problems, DGOs are introduced as multiple key distribution authorities to share the blame for GO. With the decentralization of smart grid systems and DGOs are distributed in different security domains, multi-authority ciphertext-policy attribute-based-encryption (MA-CP-ABE) might be a promising alternative to traditional cryptographic primitives in smart grids. Therefore, MA-CP-ABE scheme can provide a flexible and extensible access control mean for sharing the secret data in smart grids. In conclusion, there were many serious problems in the data sharing of smart grid, such as inflexible access control and constraints on multiparty collaboration between grid operations.
2) PRIVACY-PROTECTION
In fact, besides the electricity data, the access policy to share the electricity data is sensitive, because the access policy might directly contain the private attributes of the power data owners or the users. As a result, some GOs, such as power companies, may be reluctant to disclose the access policy to other business entities competing with it. For example, exposing some sensitive access policy of power company might increase attacks on power companies that own data. Therefore, during the process of data sharing in smart grid systems, besides the power data need to be protected, the access policy and attributes need to be protected.
There are two forms of hiding access policy including partial hiding and full hiding. In the existing ABE researches, hiding access policy is generally realized through the attribute value. Each attribute in the access policy is represented as a couple: the attribute name and the attribute value. However, it can be found that the access policy only is partially hidden. Only sensitive attribute values are hidden, but the attribute names are revealed along with the ciphertext. To make it more visual, taking an example of smart grid: if the power data owners want to share some data to the specific auditor, firstly define an access policy: (DGO Number: * ∧ ID Number: * ) ∨ (GO Number: * ∧ Employee ID: * ), then encrypt the data by using this access policy. Notice that the corresponding sensitive attribute values ''DGO1009'', ''1009-05-6741'', ''GO211'' and ''211-02-1603'' are hidden. However, if the attacker is a colleague of the specific auditor, the probability of successful attacks is greatly increased when the attribute names of the access policy is known in the plaintext form. In addition, anyone could not know the sensitive attribute information from the access policy in ABE schemes with fully hiding access policy, even authorized users who could decrypt successfully. In this paper, another method to hide access policy is considered by combining IPE technology with ABE scheme, in which the user's attribute set is sent to DGOs in form of fuzzy vector based on IPE technology, so that DGOs cannot know the specific information about attribute names or attribute values.
3) DATA-TESTING
It is performed before the full decryption, deciding whether the user's attributes satisfy the access policy specified in the ciphertext. However, in the present CP-ABE schemes, the user usually needs to do excessive calculation for decryption, then decide whether the attribute set satisfies the access policy. It means that all possible testings must be performed to find a match between the attribute set and access policy, which results in the high computation cost and useless computation. Hence, some constructions add the test phase before full decryption, but the efficiency of the test needs to be improved since the overhead of the match is based on the bilinear pairings and grows with the complexity of the policy.
4) STRONGER SECURITY
Adaptive security is a stronger security model than selective security model. The adversary needs to publish the challenge ciphertext before declaring the public parameters of the system in the selective security model. Many existing CP-ABE schemes are proven selective secure. Hence, introducing a adaptive secure access control scheme is desirable.
B. TECHNICAL CHALLENGERS 1) Our goal is to design a smart grid data sharing framework with multiple DGOs that are not always online and independent of each other.
2) It is a challenge to introduce an expressive attributebased power data sharing scheme while guaranteeing the data privacy, policy privacy and attribute privacy.
3) Reducing the complexity of the decryption-testing is also a considerable challenge, which improves the decryption efficiency.
4) A strong secure model is desirable in smart grid.
C. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we propose a privacy-protection multi-authority secure power data sharing scheme with decryption testing. Specially, the main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1) MULTI-AUTHORITY ACCESS CONTROL
We propose a smart grid data sharing scheme based on multiauthority ABE. Without reinitializing the system, multiple DGOs can enter or leave freely the system and do not need to be online all the time.
2) PRIVACY-PROTECTION
It is considered on the security of the electricity data and the privacy of the access policy in our scheme. Firstly, the electricity data is uploaded to the cloud server in the form of encryption against both malicious users and curious cloud service providers, where only authorized users can decrypt successfully it. In addition, this construction is bridged using the technique of IPE, which the access policy and attribute set are hidden by converting them into two vectors. The users could successfully obtain the decrypted data if and only if the two vectors are orthogonal.
3) DECRYPTION-TESTING
In order to solve efficiency issue and avoid the unnecessary cost before full decryption, our scheme adds a testing phase. The computation cost for the testing phase is much less than the decryption computation, so that the efficiency in our scheme is improved.
4) STRONGER SECURITY
The security of the proposed scheme is reduced to the k-Linear assumption, and it is proven adaptive security of smart grid using the dual system encryption methodology in the standard model.
D. PAPER ORGANIZATION
We present the related work in section II. Section III presents our motivations, technical challengers and contributions.
In section IV, some preliminaries including the statements of bilinear map, complexity assumptions and access structure are provided. Then the formal definition and its security model are given in section V. Section VI presents our scheme in detail. Section VII and section VIII present the security analysis and performance analysis respectively. Finally, we give a brief conclusion in section IX.
IV. PRELIMINARIES
To make the description concise, we first give some symbols used in this paper and their meanings. The details are shown in TABLE 1. 
A. BILINEAR MAP
Let G 1 , G 2 and G T be multiplicative cycle groups of same prime order p, where g 1 and g 2 are respectively the generators of G 1 , G 2 . A bilinear map e : G 1 × G 2 → G T with the following properties: 1) Bilinearity: ∀a, b ∈ Z p and e(g a 1 , g b 2 ) = e(g 1 , g 2 ) ab . Extending to matrices and vectors, it is defined as
3) Computability: there is an efficient algorithm to compute e(g 1 , g 2 ).
B. COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTIONS
For a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a k ∈ R Z * p , consider
. VOLUME 8, 2020 Then notice that A 
D. THE ENCODING FOR THRESHOLD POLICY 1) CONVERT AN ACCESS POLICY INTO A VECTOR
To achieve a t-out-of-L threshold policy, the power data owners define the access policy W = {t 1,n 1 , t 2,n 2 , . . . , t j,n j }, choose t random coefficients a i R ← − Z p and define a polynomial f (x) of degree t − 1:
For {t i,j ∈ W} and sets
2) CONVERT AN ATTRIBUTE SET INTO A VECTOR
Users request the corresponding keys from DGOs using attribute set S = {v 1,n 1 , v 2,n 2 , . . . , v j,n j } in their possession, then compute Lagrange
The decryption process performs the Lagrangian interpolation on the exponent, over the shares encoded in the ciphertext.
V. SYSTEM AND SECURITY MODEL A. SYSTEM MODEL
The structure considers a smart grid access control system as illustrated in FIGURE 3, and it consists of the following entities: 
1) GRID OPERATOR (GO)
As the certificate center, it sets up the smart grid system. GO is in charge of authorizing access privileges of users in the system according to users' GID. If a user is legal, GO issues the identity-key to the user.
2) DISTRIBUTED GRID OPERATORS (DGOs)
It sets up its own domain. Each DGO is responsible for managing attributes and issuing attribute-keys to users according to users' attribute sets.
3) CLOUD STORAGE CENTER
It stores the power data in encrypted form from the power data owners and provides the storage services to users.
Cloud storage center is not involved in access control enforcement or data decryption process.
4) POWER DATA OWNERS
The power data owners are including RTUs and electricity consumers in this system. They define an access policy over a set of attributes and encrypt the power data under the access policy. Then power data owners upload the encrypted power data to cloud storage center.
5) USERS
The users might be maintenance officers, system engineers, researchers, policy makers and auditors. Each user is assigned with a GID from GO and entitled to a set of attributes from DGOs. After users download the encrypted power data from cloud storage center, if users want to decrypt it, users need to prove its identity to GO and request the secret keys to DGOs. Notice that the encrypted power data can be decrypted by users successfully, if and only if users' attribute sets satisfy the access policies.
B. ALGORITHMS
The proposed scheme consists of a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms, such that:
The algorithm is run by GO. It inputs security parameters 1 λ , then returns the public parameters pp in the system. In addition, it generates a pair of sign and verification keys Sign,Verify.
• DGOs-Setup (pp, i → PK i , MK i ): The algorithm is run by DGOs. It inputs the public parameters pp and the index of DGOs i, then returns the public keys PK i and the master keys MK i .
• GO-KeyGen (pp, GID, → SK gid ): The algorithm is run by GO. It inputs the public parameters pp and user's global identifier GID, then returns the identity-key SK gid to the user.
The algorithm is run by DGOs. It inputs the public parameters pp, the master keys MK i and the encoding vector − → y of the attribute set S, then returns the attribute-keys SK i,j to the user.
The algorithm is run by the power data owners. It inputs the public key PK i , the public parameters pp, the power data M power and the encoding vector − → x of the access policy W, then outputs the ciphertext CT power . 
C. SECURITY MODEL
A security model of the proposed scheme is presented, and it is described by a game between an attacker A and a challenge C. The stages of the game are as follows:
• Initialization: A outputs the set of corrupt authorities DGO * to C. Then C outputs pp to A.
• Authorities Setup: For each one of the non-corrupt authorities, C sends PK i to A.
• Phase 1: A submits the attribute vector − → y and GID to C for secret keys queries, where − → y is the encoding vector of attribute set S . 
• Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeated. C checks that the attribute vector − → y is not orthogonal to either of the two policy vectors − → x 0 , − → x 1 , and the attribute set corresponding to − → y cannot be controlled by corrupt authorities.
• Guess: Finally, A outputs a guess ξ on ξ . If ξ = ξ , A wins the game.
VI. SECURE DATA SHARING IN SMART GRID BY MULTI-AUTHORITY ABE WITH TESTING
Let the attribute universe be I C = {att 1 , . . . , att n }. Furthermore, we introduce a strong collision-resistant hash function
The construction is presented as follows:
A. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION GO sets up the system by running GO-Setup Algorithm 1. DGOs also sets up its own domain by running DGOs-Setup Algorithm 2.
• GO-Setup: It is described as Algorithm 1.
• DGOs-Setup: DGO i remains the master keys MK i , then publishes the public keys PK i as described in Algorithm 2.
B. AUTHENTICATION AND PRIVATE KEY REQUESTS
When a user joins the system, GO assigns a unique GID to the user. Firstly, the user needs to convert own attribute set S into a vector − → y through the encoding for threshold policy in subsection D of section III. Then the user needs to submit the attribute vector − → y and GID to GO. For legitimate users who have completed the registration, GO issues the identifykey SK gid to them by running the GO-KeyGen Algorithm 3, which is used to generate a signature of GO. If the user wants to decrypt the ciphertext, the user needs to submit attribute Algorithm 1 GO-Setup Input: the security parameter λ Output: the public parameters pp 1 Select randomly two cyclic groups G 1 and G 2 with prime order p; 2 Define g 1 , g 2 be two generators of G 1 , G 2 respectively; 3 Let e : G 1 × G 2 → G T be a bilinear map; 4 Define N DGOs in this system, and each DGO i manages respectively attribute set S i , where S i S j = ∅ for all i = j, and
Compute P 1 = g A 1 , P 2 = g B 2 and X = g P A 1 ; 7 Define sign =(KeyGen, Sign, Verify) be the description of an signature scheme as in [11] ; 8 Generate sign key pair (Sign, Verify) by running the KeyGen algorithm of sign ; 9 return pp = {G 1 , G 2 , G T , e, p, g 1 , g 2 , P 1 , P 2 , X ,Verify};
Algorithm 2 DGOs-Setup
Input: pp and the index of DGOs i Output: the master keys MK i and the public keys PK i 1 for i from 1 to N do 2 
Select randomly two matrixes
set S and identify-key SK gid with a signature of GO to each DGO i for requiring the secret keys. Later, each DGO i verifies the signature on SK gid using Verify. After authenticating the signature, each DGO i generates the attribute-keys SK i,j for the user by running the DGOs-KeyGen Algorithm 4, and sends them to the user.
• GO-KeyGen: The user computes u = H (GID, − → y ) and sends it to GO. After authenticating the user's identity, if the user is legal, DGO i sends the identify-key SK gid for the user. It is described as Algorithm 3.
• DGOs-KeyGen: The user submits the attribute set S and SK gid with a signature of GO to each DGO i . Then, each DGO i calculates the item y j through converting attribute set S ∩S i as subsection D of section III. |S ∩S i | shows the number of the attributes in S ∩ S i . After authenticating the signature, each DGO i sends SK i,j to the user. It is described as Algorithm 4.
C. DATA PUBLICATION
The power data owners define an access policy W, and convert it into a vector − → x through the encoding for threshold
Algorithm 3 GO-KeyGen
Input: pp and the user's identity u Output: the identify-key SK gid
Algorithm 4 DGOs-KeyGen
Input: MK i , the encoding vector − → y and SK gid Output: the attribute-keys SK i,j 1 for i from 1 to N do 2 for j from 1 to |S ∩ S i | do 3 Compute
policy in subsection D of section III. Then the power data owners encrypt the power data M power under the vector − → x by running the Encryption Algorithm 5, then uploads the power data in encrypted form CT power to the cloud storage center.
• Encryption: It is described as Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Encryption
Input: PK i , the encoding vector − → x and the power data M power Output: the power data in encrypted form CT power
Any user can get the power data encrypted from the cloud storage center, but can decrypt it if and only if the user's attribute set S satisfies the access policy W. Specially, the decryption process is divided into two phases: Test-Phase and Decryption-Phase. In order to reduce the cost of decryption, the user first checks whether the condition is satisfied 
where let the above expression be Dec; 2 if l+1 j=1 x j y j = 0 (namely S W) then 3 Have Dec = M power ; 4 return M power ; 5 end 6 else 7 return ⊥; 8 end the adversary. Meanwhile, it is proven that the construction is attribute-hiding.
In order to resisting the collusion attack for multi-authority ABE scheme, the masking terms W i B − → r are specified in our construction. And the challenger generates W i B − → r for honest authorities in the process of security proof. Therefore, the keys SK i,j associated with W i B − → r are random in view of the adversary as long as there is more than one honest authority, unless canceled by multiplication with {g W i B − → r 2 : ∀i ∈ DGO * }, where DGO * is the set of corrupt authorities. Define −−−→ α honest = i ∈DGO * − → α i = − → α − i∈DGO * − → α i and SK honest = i ∈DGO * SK i,j . Therefore, the challenger needs to simulate SK honest using −−−→ α honest instead of − → α .
A. GAME SEQUENCE
The proof is composed of a series of games. We outline the sequence of games and the details are as follows:
• Game 0 : It is the actual security game following the security model. All the challenge ciphertext and private keys are normal.
• Game 1,j,1 : It is the same as Game 0 expect that the type of the private keys. In the game, the first j − 1 keys are semi-functional keys and h = B − → r + a ⊥r in j-th key. For q keys queries, the response of the challenger C is as follows: -The first j-1 keys queries: The challenger C selects
andt ∈ Z p under the condition A a ⊥ = 0. Then C answers:
The j-th key queries: The challenger C selects ran-
andr ∈ Z p under the condition B b ⊥ = 0, and computes h = B − → r + a ⊥r . Then C answers:
The last q − j keys queries: C answers:
The game is the same as Game 1,j,1 expect that the j-th key is a semi-functional key. For j-th key query, C answers:
The game is the same as Game 1,j,2 expect that letting h = B − → r in j − th key query. For j − th key query, C answers:
Note that Game 1,0,3 is exactly the same as Game 0 .
• Game 2 : The game is the same as Game 1,q,3 expect that the type of the challenger ciphertext. In the game, the challenger ciphertext is semi-functional ciphertext. C selects randomly − → z ∈ Z k+1 p and generates:
It is the same as Game 2 expect that the challenge ciphertext is generated by encrypting a random message M in G T .
• Game 4 : The game is the same as Game 3 expect that the policy vector − → x is replaced by a vector − → x b such that x b,i R ← − Z p : ∀i ∈ DGO * , namely at least one attribute according to − → x b is controlled by an honest authority.
Theorem 1: Our construction is adaptively secure under the k-Linear assumption.
B. PROOF
Theorem 1 is proved by Lemma 1 to 6. 1) INDISTINGUISHABILITY OF GAME 0 AND GAME 1,j,1 Lemma 1: Assume that there is an attacker A that executes q key queries at most can distinguish Game 0 and Game 1,j,1 with a non-negligible advantage, for j = 1, 2, . . . q. Then we can structure an algorithm B that could solve the k-Linear assumption with a non-negligible advantage, i.e.
The public parameters, authority public keys and challenger ciphertext are constructed as in actual scheme.
Keys Query: A submits the attributes vector − → y and GID for secret keys queries. On input of the n-th key query. B outputs
Challenge: A submits two policy vectors − → x 0 , − → x 1 and two equal-length messages M 0 , M 1 . B tosses randomly a coin ξ ∈ {0, 1}, then outputs the challenge ciphertext CT ξ R ← − Encryption( − → x ξ , M ξ ) to A, where − → x ξ is the encoding vector of policy W ξ . B selects randomly − → s , − → s * ∈ Z k p and computes:
If the Z β ∈ span(B)(namely β = 0), the keys and random oracle responses are distributed exactly as in Game 0 . If β = 1, the distribution is as in Game 1,j,1 . Based on the k-Linear assumption, the two games could be distinguished by A with negligible advantage.
2) INDISTINGUISHABILITY OF GAME 1,j,1 AND GAME 1,j,2 Lemma 2: For j = 1, 2, . . . q, any attacker A that executes q key queries at most, has no advantage to distinguish between Game 1,j,1 and Game 1,j,2 , i.e. | Adv Game 1,j,1 (λ) − Adv Game 1,j,2 (λ) |= 0 Proof: The difference between the two games is that there is an additional item g 2 a ⊥t in Game 1,j,2 comparing with Game 1,j,1 in the j-th key query.
Authorities Setup: For each one of the non-corrupt authori-
,t ∈ Z p , and performs the following transforms of variables:
The distributions of U i , W i and U i , W i are clearly identical, respectively. Using U i and W i instead of U i and W i , B generates the public keys as follows:
Challenge: B generates the ciphertext as follows:
Keys Query: A submits the attributes vector − → y and GID for secret keys queries. About input of the j-th key query, B answers using U i , W i as follows:
| is the number of non-corrupt authorities. And we have
Now we obtain the exact distribution of Game 1,j,2 .
3) INDISTINGUISHABILITY OF GAME 1,j,2 AND GAME 1,j,3
Lemma 3: Assume that there is an attacker A that executes q key queries at most can distinguish Game 1,j,2 and Game 1,j,3 with a non-negligible advantage, for j = 1, 2, . . . q. Then we can structure an algorithm B that could solve the k-Linear assumption with a non-negligible advantage, i.e.
receives an instance of a k-Linear decision problem to distinguish Z 0 and Z 1 , where − → z is random element in Z k+1 p . The public parameters, authority public keys and challenging ciphertext are constructed as in actual scheme.
Keys Query: A submits the attributes vector − → y and GID for secret keys queries. On input of the n − th key query, B outputs
If the Z β ∈ span(B)(namely β = 0), the keys and random oracle responses are distributed exactly as in Game 1,j,3 . If β = 1, the distribution is as in Game 1,j,2 . Based on the k-Linear assumption, the two games could be distinguished by A with negligible advantage.
4) INDISTINGUISHABILITY OF GAME 1,q,3 AND GAME 2
Lemma 4: Assume that there is an attacker A could distinguish Game 1,q,3 and Game 2 with a non-negligible advantage. Then we could structure an algorithm B that could solve the k-Linear assumption with a non-negligible advantage, i.e. 
,t ∈ Z p as in the actual scheme, and sends the public keys of the authority PK i = {V 1,i = g
Keys Query: A submits the attributes vector − → y and GID for secret keys queries. After receiving the j − th key query, B outputs: 
, the keys and random oracle responses are distributed exactly as in Game 1,q,3 . Otherwise, the distribution is as in Game 2 . Based on the k-Linear assumption, the two games could be distinguished by A with negligible advantage.
5) INDISTINGUISHABILITY OF GAME 2 AND GAME 3
Lemma 5: Game 2 and Game 3 are statistically close and can not be distinguished with any advantage by the adversary, i.e. 
Keys Query: A submits the attributes vector − → y and GID for secret keys queries. B sends the secret keys as follows:
Challenge: A submits two policy vectors − → x 0 , − → x 1 and two equal-length messages M 0 , M 1 . B tosses randomly a coin ξ ∈ {0, 1}, then outputs the challenge ciphertext CT ξ 
is uniform in G 1 . Therefore Game 3 and Game 4 can not be distinguished with any advantage by the adversary. In Game 4 the adversary view is statistically independent of the challenger's choice of b, and the adversary cannot win the game by any advantage.
In conclusion, if lemma 1, lemma 2, lemma 3, lemma 4, lemma 5 and lemma 6 can be proven to be true, we can infer that it is indistinguishable between the Game 0 and Game 4 . Based on the proof of this series of games and the six lemmas, the adversary's advantage in real security games is negligible. Therefore, there is no adversary can break the scheme with a non-negligible advantage.
VIII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Firstly, we define some relevant parameters in TABLE 3. 
A. THEORY ANALYSIS
The theory analysis on the performance of the proposed scheme is performed as TABLE 4 through comparing with [21] - [24] . The comparisons are performed according to different aspects, including the type of schemes, whether DGOs are independent or not, decryption-testing, privacyprotection, fully policy-hiding, IPE technology and adaptive security.
It's clear that these scheme realizes the privacy-protection and schemes [23] , [24] realize fully policy-hiding as TABLE 4. Besides, our scheme supports decryption-testing and implements fully policy-hiding based on IPE technology. It is easy to see that our solution achieves the optimal compromise between privacy-protection and the efficiency on the user side. The schemes [21] - [23] only realize the selective security, but scheme [24] and ours are proven secure in adaptive security model. In addition, compared with [24] , our scheme is more flexible in multi-authority environments, which authorities can enter and away the system freely, and generate the secret keys independently without cooperation each other.
Besides, the further comparisons between our scheme and scheme [21] - [24] in the aspect of the KeyGen cost, encryption cost, test cost and decryption cost in TABLE 5. From TABLE 5, our scheme is superior to schemes [23] and [24] with respect to the KeyGen phase and Decryption phase. The existence of hash functions O(H) in [23] and [24] results in our scheme being more efficient in KeyGen phase and Decryption phase than [24] and [23] .
B. SIMULATION TEST
In the section, the actual performance of the proposed MA-CP-ABE scheme [24] and [23] are analyzed. Compared with [24] and [23] , the results show that our construction has obvious advantages in many ways. The experimental environment is divided into server side and client side. The server side is Windows 7 desktop system with 2.60 GHz Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-4210M CPU and 4 GB RAM, which is used as cloud server to share encrypted electricity data. The client side is Windows 7 desktop system with 2.3 GHZ Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-6200 CPU and 4 GB RAM, which is used to test the cost of decryption-testing and decryption operation. The code uses Pairing Based Cryptography library to achieve the access control scheme, which supports pairing operation. Type A pairing is used in the simulation, which is structured on the curve over the field for some prime q. The pairing is symmetric, where the order of groups is 160 bits, the base field size is 512 bits.
1) EVALUATION OF THE STORAGE COST
FIGURE 4(a) exhibits the storage cost output of each algorithm in our scheme and schemes [23] , [24] . In the simulation, the length of an element in group G 1 , G 2 and G T is established to 512 bits. Assume that there are 10 authorities (where N = 10) that each authority manages 5 attributes respectively. From FIGURE 4(a), compared with [24] and [23] , it is obvious that the lesser spaces are need to storage public keys for the power data owners and secret keys for the users in our construction.
2) EVALUATION OF TIME COST
The secret keys are issued to the authorized users in Key-Gen algorithm. FIGURE 4(b) exhibits the time of executing KeyGen algorithm, in which it is linear to N S in two schemes. Encryption algorithm returns the encrypted form of the electricity data, which is embedded an access policy consisting of N W attributes. FIGURE 4(c) exhibits the time spend of executing Encryption algorithm, and the weakness of encryption efficiency is a compromise to security performance in our construction. As FIGURE 4(d), it takes greatly short time than [24] and [23] to decrypt successfully in our scheme due to the decryption-testing operation. Once the access policy cannot be satisfied by the user's attribute set, we only perform the decryption-testing algorithm rather than the whole decryption operation. From FIGURE 4(d) , we can see that, it takes less time in decryption-testing algorithm than in decryption operation.
IX. CONCLUSION
To solve the privacy preserving and data security in data sharing of smart grid, a multi-authority access control scheme with privacy-preserving is introduced. The construction utilizes the technique of IPE, in which the access policy and the attribute set are fuzzy by converting them into two vectors, and only when the two vectors are orthogonal can users successfully obtain the shared data. In addition, in order to improve efficiency, a testing phase is added before recovering data to avoid the unnecessary operation in our construction. The security of the proposed scheme is reduced to the standard decisional bilinear k-Linear assumption instead of others strong assumptions. Finally, performance analysis shows that the proposed approach has stronger performance advantage than the known schemes.
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